Draft Details
- Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Po...
- Draft Standard
- Legal Notice for Draft Standards
- Preface
- + 0 Introduction
- 0.1 General
- 0.2 Objectives of a PSA
- 0.3 Reactor technology
- + 1 Scope
- 1.1 Reactors and other potential sources
- 1.2 New and existing reactors
- 1.3 Single and multi-reactor facilities
- 1.4 Level 1 PSA and Level 2 PSA
- 1.4 A Whole-site PSA
- 1.5 Malevolent acts
- 1.6 Terminology
- 1.7 Additional terminology
- 2 Reference publications
- + 3 Definitions and abbreviations
- 3.1 Definitions
- 3.2 Abbreviations
- + 4 General requirements
- 4.1 Systematic approach
- 4.2 Graded approach
- 4.2 A Whole-site PSA
- + 4.3 Level of detail
- 4.3.1 Level of detail
- 4.3.2 Radioactive sources
- 4.3.3 Treatment of similar radioactive sources
- 4.3.4 Selection of a representative radioactive...
- + 4.4 Best estimate approach
- 4.4.1 Use of the best estimate approach
- 4.4.2 Use of conservative approaches
- 4.4.3 Limitations on the use of conservative ap...
- 4.4.4 Sensitivity analysis for conservative app...
- + 4.5 Model consistency
- 4.5.1 Existing NPP PSA consistency with the pla...
- 4.5.2 PSA consistency with the plant conditions...
- 4.5.3 New NPP PSA consistency with the plant co...
- 4.5.4 Common representation
- + 4.6 Use of screening approaches
- 4.6.1 Purpose of the screening approach in PSA
- 4.6.2 Screening approaches and methods
- 4.6.3 Screening of potential risk contributors
- 4.6.4 Basis for screening out a risk contributo...
- 4.6.5 Confirmation of screening through walkdow...
- + 4.7 Expert judgment
- 4.7.1 Use of expert judgement
- 4.7.2 Justification of expert judgement
- 4.7.3 Expert judgement and sensitivity analysis...
- 4.7.4 Expert judgement and independent review
- + 4.8 Peer review
- 4.8.1 PSA peer review
- 4.8.2 PSA peer review process
- + 4.9 PSA applications
- 4.9.1 PSA use for safety management
- 4.9.2 Uncertainty considerations in PSA applica...
- + 5 Potential sources of radioactive releases
- + 5.1 Comprehensive list
- 5.1.1 Consideration of potential radioactive so...
- 5.1.2 Review of the list of radioactive sources...
- + 5.2 Screening potential sources
- 5.2.1 Screening of radioactive sources
- 5.2.2 Screening criteria for radioactive source...
- + 6 Hazard identification
- + 6.1 Range of hazards
- 6.1.1 List of potential hazards
- 6.1.2 Scope of potential hazards
- 6.1.3 Additional hazards
- 6.1.4 Confirmatory walkdown of potential hazard...
- 6.1.5 Review of potential hazards list
- + 6.2 Sub-division of hazards
- 6.2.1 Subdivision of hazards
- 6.2.2 Justification of subdivision of hazards
- + 6.3 Combinations of hazards
- 6.3.1 Combination of hazards
- 6.3.2 Types of combinations of hazards
- + 6.4 Hazard screening
- 6.4.1 Screening approaches
- 6.4.2 Exclusion of hazard combinations
- 6.4.3 Screening criteria of hazard combinations...
- 6.4.4 Sub-divided hazards
- 6.4.5 Multi-unit hazards
- + 7 Plant operating states
- 7.1 Comprehensive list of POSs
- 7.2 Planned evolutions
- 7.3 A Unplanned evolutions
- 7.3 Attributes of a POS
- 7.4 Multi-reactor POSs
- 7.5 Screening POSs
- + 7.6 Grouping POSs
- 7.6.1 Similarity of POSs
- 7.6.2 Bounding POS
- + 8 Level 1 PSA
- 8.1 Additional provisions for power reactors
- + 8.2 Scope and elements of a Level 1 PSA
- 8.2.1 Scope of a Level 1 PSA
- 8.2.2 Elements of a Level 1 PSA
- 8.3 Hazard characterization for Level 1 PSA
- + 8.4 Accident sequence analysis
- 8.4.1 Scope of accident sequence analysis
- 8.4.2 Plant response
- 8.4.3 Process upsets
- 8.4.4 Mitigation
- 8.4.5 Dependency
- 8.4.6 End state
- 8.4.7 Event tree
- + 8.5 Success criteria
- 8.5.1 Definition of success criteria
- 8.5.2 Basis for success criteria
- 8.5.3 Justification of success criteria
- 8.5.4 Sequence specific success criteria
- 8.5.5 Common success criteria
- 8.5.6 Validity of common success criteria
- 8.5.7 Sensitivity to common success criteria
- + 8.6 System analysis
- + 8.6.1 General requirements
- 8.6.1.1
- 8.6.1.2
- + 8.6.2 Fault trees
- 8.6.2.1 Scope of fault tree development
- 8.6.2.2 Labelling scheme
- 8.6.2.3 Significant component failure modes
- 8.6.2.4 Exclusion of beneficial failure modes
- 8.6.2.5 Modelling of return to service
- 8.6.2.6 Mission time selection
- 8.6.2.7 Mission time justification
- 8.6.2.8 Software reliability
- + 8.6.3 Common cause failures
- 8.6.3.1
- 8.6.3.2
- 8.6.3.3
- + 8.7 Human reliability analysis
- + 8.7.1 General requirements
- 8.7.1.1
- 8.7.1.2
- 8.7.1.3
- 8.7.1.4
- 8.7.1.5
- 8.7.1.6
- 8.7.1.7
- 8.7.1.8
- 8.7.1.9
- 8.7.1.10
- 8.7.1.11
- 8.7.1.12
- + 8.7.2 Human error probabilities
- 8.7.2.1
- 8.7.2.2
- 8.7.2.3
- 8.7.2.4
- 8.7.2.5
- 8.7.2.6
- 8.7.2.7
- + 8.8 Basic event data analysis
- 8.8.1 Basic event probability
- 8.8.2 Use of mean probability
- 8.8.3 Use of point estimate probability
- 8.8.4 Basic event data sources
- 8.8.5 Use of operating experience
- 8.8.6 Exclusion of operating experience
- 8.8.7 Blending data sources
- 8.8.8 Justification of blended data sources
- 8.8.9 Uncertainty analysis of basic event proba...
- 8.8.10 Sensitivity analysis of basic event prob...
- + 8.9 Level 1 PSA quantification
- 8.9.1 General
- 8.9.2 Model integration
- 8.9.3 Circular logic
- 8.9.4 Truncation limit
- + 8.9.5 Quantification methodology
- 8.9.5.1
- 8.9.5.2
- + 8.9.6 Cutset review
- 8.9.6.1
- 8.9.6.2
- 8.9.6.3
- 8.9.7 Cliff-edge effects
- + 8.10 Sensitivity analysis
- 8.10.1 Purpose of sensitivity analysis
- 8.10.2 Scope of sensitivity analysis
- 8.10.3 Types of sensitivity analysis
- 8.10.4 Justification of sensitivity analysis
- 8.10.5 PSA inputs reassessment criteria
- + 8.11 Uncertainty analysis
- 8.11.1 Purpose of uncertainty analysis
- 8.11.2 Scope of uncertainty analysis
- 8.11.3 Completeness uncertainty
- 8.11.4 Modelling uncertainty
- 8.11.5 Parametric uncertainty
- 8.11.6 Parametric uncertainty distributions
- 8.11.7 Parametric uncertainty analysis
- + 8.12 Importance analysis
- 8.12.1 Important contributors
- 8.12.2 Types of importance analysis
- 8.12.3 Justification of importance analysis
- 8.12.4 Scope of importance analysis
- 8.12.5 Importance measures
- 8.12.6 Confirmation of importance analysis resu...
- 8.12.7 Reassessment of important contributors
- 8.13 Level 1 PSA for other POSs
- + 9 Level 2 PSA
- 9.1 Additional provisions for power reactors
- + 9.2 Scope and elements of Level 2 PSA
- 9.2.1 Scope of a Level 2 PSA
- 9.2.2 Elements of a Level 2 PSA
- + 9.3 Interface with Level 1 PSA
- 9.3.1 Grouping of Level 1 PSA sequences
- 9.3.2 Justification for grouping of Level 1 PSA...
- 9.3.3 Representative sequences
- + 9.4 Accident progression analysis
- 9.4.1 NPP-specific accident progression analysi...
- 9.4.2 Reference NPP selection
- 9.4.3 Reference NPP justification
- 9.4.4 Scope of accident progression analysis
- 9.4.5 Relevant phenomena for accident progressi...
- 9.4.6 Thermal hydraulic analysis
- 9.4.7 Simulated duration for accident progressi...
- 9.4.8 Results of accident progression analysis
- 9.5 Level 2 PSA Human reliability analysis
- 9.6 Level 2 PSA Data analysis
- + 9.7 Release categorization and source term anal...
- 9.7.1 Accident progression end states
- 9.7.2 Grouping accident progression end states ...
- 9.7.3 Scope of source term analysis
- 9.7.4 Factors for source term analysis
- 9.7.5 Grouping of fission products
- + 9.8 Level 2 PSA quantification
- 9.8.1 General
- 9.8.2 Model integration
- 9.8.3 Dependencies
- 9.8.4 Circular logic
- 9.8.5 Truncation limit
- 9.8.6 Rare event approximation
- 9.8.7 Cutset review
- 9.8.8 Cliff-edge effects
- 9.8.9 Large release sequences review
- + 9.9 Level 2 PSA sensitivity analysis and attrib...
- 9.9.1 Level 2 PSA sensitivity analysis
- 9.9.2 Level 2 PSA sensitivity analysis attribut...
- 9.10 Level 2 PSA uncertainty analysis
- + 9.11 Level 2 PSA Importance analysis
- 9.11.1 Level 2 PSA importance analysis requirem...
- 9.11.2 Additional importance analysis for Level...
- 9.11.3 Phenomenological event importance analys...
- 9.12 Level 2 PSA for other POSs
- + 10 PSA update
- + 10.1 General
- 10.1.1 Purpose of PSA update
- 10.1.2 PSA update process
- 10.1.3 PSA update criteria
- 10.1.4 Evaluation of changes
- 10.1.5 Changes to be considered
- 10.2 Periodic updates
- + 10.3 Non-routine updates
- 10.3.1 Requirement for non-routine update
- 10.3.2 Non-routine update criteria
- 10.3.3 Scope of Non-routine update
- 10.3.4 Applicable clauses for non-routine updat...
- + 11 Documentation
- + 11.1 Initial preparation
- 11.1.1 Documentation requirements
- 11.1.2 Residual risk
- 11.1.3 Uncertainty
- 11.2 Periodic updates
- + 11.3 Non-routine updates
- 11.3.1 Scope of change
- 11.3.2 Impact of change
- + 12 Application of PSA to the management of BDBA...
- 12.1 General requirements
- 12.2 Accident management procedures
- 12.3 Emergency planning
- 12.4 Cliff-edge effects
- + 12.5 Design extension conditions
- 12.5.1 Identification of DECs
- 12.5.2 Assessment of DECs
- + 13 Considerations for whole-site PSA
- 13.1 Approach for whole-site PSA
- 13.2 Consideration for whole-site PSA
- 13.3 Integrated approach for whole-site PSA
- 13.4 Discrete approach for whole-site PSA
- 13.5 Composite approach for whole-site PSA
- 13.6 Aggregation of risk metrics
- 13.7 Justification of approach for whole-site P...
- + Annex A (informative)
- + A.1 External hazards
- A.1.1 Airborne and extra-terrestrial hazards
- A.1.2 Water-based hazards
- A.1.3 Ground-based hazards
- A.2 Internal hazards
- Annex B (informative)
- + Annex C (normative)
- + C.1 Introduction
- C.1.1 Elements of Level 1 PSA
- C.1.2 Elements of Level 2 PSA
- + C.2 Level 1 PSA for internal events at power
- + C.2.1 Hazard characterization
- C.2.1.1 General
- + C.2.1.2 Initiating event identification
- C.2.1.2.1
- C.2.1.2.2
- C.2.1.2.3
- C.2.1.2.4
- C.2.1.2.5
- C.2.1.2.6
- C.2.1.2.7
- + C.2.1.3 IE grouping
- C.2.1.3.1
- C.2.1.3.2
- C.2.1.3.3
- C.2.1.3.4
- C.2.1.3.5
- + C.2.1.4 Quantification of IE frequency
- C.2.1.4.1
- C.2.1.4.2
- C.2.1.4.3
- C.2.1.4.3.1
- C.2.1.4.3.2
- C.2.1.4.3.3
- C.2.1.4.4
- C.2.1.4.5
- C.2.1.4.6
- C.2.1.4.7
- C.2.1.4.8
- C.2.1.4.9
- C.2.1.4.10
- C.2.1.4.11
- C.2.1.4.12
- C.2.1.4.13
- C.2.1.4.14
- C.2.2 Accident sequence analysis
- C.2.3 Success criteria
- C.2.4 System analysis
- C.2.5 Human reliability analysis
- C.2.6 Data analysis
- + C.2.7 Level 1 PSA quantification
- C.2.7.1 Level 1 PSA quantification requirements...
- C.2.7.2 Level 1 PSA sensitivity analysis
- C.2.7.3 Level 1 PSA uncertainty analysis
- C.2.7.4 Level 1 PSA importance analysis
- C.3 Level 1 PSA for internal events for other P...
- + C.4 Level 2 PSA for internal events at power
- + C.4.1 Interface with Level 1 PSA
- C.4.1.1 Interface requirements
- C.4.1.2 Containment bypass
- C.4.1.3 Pre-initiator state of containment syst...
- + C.4.2 Accident progression analysis
- C.4.2.1 General
- C.4.2.2 Containment systems fault tree developm...
- + C.4.2.3 CET development
- C.4.2.3.1
- C.4.2.3.2
- C.4.2.3.3
- C.4.2.4 CET branch point quantification
- + C.4.2.5 Capability of containment
- C.4.2.5.1
- C.4.2.5.2
- C.4.2.5.3
- + C.4.3 Containment release categorization and so...
- C.4.3.1 Release categorization and source term ...
- C.4.3.2 Additional factors for source term anal...
- + C.4.4 Level 2 PSA quantification
- C.4.4.1 Level 2 PSA quantification requirements...
- C.4.4.2 Sensitivity and uncertainty of release ...
- C.4.4.3 Level 2 PSA sensitivity analysis
- C.4.4.4 Level 2 PSA uncertainty analysis
- C.4.4.5 Level 2 PSA importance analysis
- C.5 Level 2 PSA for internal events for other P...
- + Annex D (normative)
- + D.1 Introduction
- + D.1.1 Description and scope of internal fires P...
- D.1.1.1 Scope of internal fires PSA
- D.1.1.2 Seismically induced fires
- D.1.2 Elements of internal fires PSA
- + D.2 Level 1 PSA for internal fires at power
- + D.2.1 Plant boundary definition and partitionin...
- D.2.1.1 Global plant boundary analysis
- D.2.1.2 Plant partitioning
- D.2.1.3 Plant partitioning confirmatory walkdow...
- + D.2.2 Fire PSA component selection
- D.2.2.1 Categories to consider for component se...
- D.2.2.2 Fire-induced IE
- D.2.2.3 Components related to accident progress...
- D.2.2.4 Components related to credited mitigati...
- D.2.2.5 Fire-induced failure modes
- D.2.2.6 Instrumentation
- D.2.2.7 Supporting information
- + D.2.3 Fire PSA cable selection
- D.2.3.1 Cable list for selected PSA components
- D.2.3.2 Cable location
- D.2.3.3 Cable location information
- D.2.3.4 Cable location defined using a conserva...
- D.2.3.5 Cable routing justification based on a ...
- D.2.3.6 Cable list location exclusionary treatm...
- + D.2.4 Qualitative screening
- D.2.4.1 Qualitative screening basis
- D.2.4.2 Qualitative screening criteria
- + D.2.5 Fire PSA model
- D.2.5.1 Fire-induced risk model
- D.2.5.2 Fire-induced risk model elements
- D.2.5.3 Use of internal events PSA models
- D.2.5.4 Consideration of equipment not explicit...
- + D.2.6 Fire ignition frequencies
- D.2.6.1 Fire ignition sources
- D.2.6.2 Fixed ignition sources plant walkdown
- D.2.6.3 Fixed ignition sources identification f...
- D.2.6.4 Transient combustible fires
- D.2.6.5 Fire ignition frequency quantification
- + D.2.7 Quantitative screening
- D.2.7.1 Quantitative screening objective
- D.2.7.2 Quantitative screening criteria
- + D.2.8 Scoping fire modelling
- D.2.8.1 Scoping fire modelling objective
- D.2.8.2 Scoping fire modelling for transient ig...
- D.2.8.3 Scoping fire modelling for selected PSA...
- D.2.8.4 Scoping fire modelling conditions
- D.2.8.5 Scoping fire modelling plant walkdown
- D.2.8.6 Alternatives to plant walkdown for scop...
- + D.2.9 Detailed circuit analysis
- D.2.9.1 Detailed circuit analysis objective
- D.2.9.2 Consideration of equipment response
- + D.2.10 Circuit failure mode likelihood analysis...
- D.2.10.1 Circuit failure mode likelihood analys...
- D.2.10.2 Circuit failure mode likelihood analys...
- + D.2.11 Detailed fire modelling
- D.2.11.1 Detailed fire modelling objective
- D.2.11.2 Detailed fire modelling for main contr...
- D.2.11.3 Detailed fire modelling for multi-comp...
- D.2.11.4 Detailed fire modelling plant walkdown...
- + D.2.12 Post-fire human reliability analysis
- D.2.12.1 Identification of post-fire operator a...
- D.2.12.2 Post-fire HRA methodology
- D.2.12.3 Post-fire HRA performance shaping fact...
- + D.2.13 Level 1 fire PSA quantification
- D.2.13.1 Level 1 fire PSA quantification requir...
- D.2.13.2 Level 1 fire PSA quantification object...
- D.2.13.3 Level 1 fire PSA sensitivity analysis
- D.2.13.4 Level 1 fire PSA uncertainty analysis
- D.2.13.5 Level 1 fire PSA importance analysis
- D.3 Level 1 fire PSA for other POSs
- + D.4 Level 2 fire PSA at power
- D.4.1 Level 2 fire PSA considerations
- + D.4.2 Level 2 fire PSA quantification
- D.4.2.1 Level 2 fire PSA quantification require...
- D.4.2.2 Level 2 fire PSA sensitivity analysis
- D.4.2.3 Level 2 fire PSA uncertainty analysis
- D.4.2.4 Level 2 fire PSA importance analysis
- D.5 Level 2 fire PSA for other POSs
- + Annex E (normative)
- + E.1 Introduction
- + E.1.1 Description and scope of seismic PSA
- E.1.1.1 Evaluation methodologies
- E.1.1.2 Seismically induced internal fires and ...
- E.1.1.3 Scope of seismic PSA
- E.1.2 Elements of seismic PSA
- + E.2 Level 1 seismic PSA at power
- + E.2.1 Seismic hazard analysis
- E.2.1.1 Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
- E.2.1.2 Ground motion parameter
- E.2.1.3 Use of Peak Ground Acceleration as a gr...
- E.2.1.4 Range of ground motion parameter
- E.2.1.5 Inputs to PSHA
- E.2.1.6 PSHA outputs
- + E.2.2 Seismic fragility analysis
- E.2.2.1 Scope of seismic fragility analysis
- E.2.2.2 Structural response analysis
- E.2.2.3 Seismic equipment list
- E.2.2.4 Basis for seismic fragility
- E.2.2.5 Seismic screening
- E.2.2.6 Equipment response analysis
- E.2.2.7 Seismic failure modes
- E.2.2.8 Objectives of seismic fragility analysi...
- E.2.2.9 Inputs to seismic fragility evaluation
- E.2.2.10 Seismic walkdown
- E.2.2.11 Walkdown evaluation of seismically ind...
- E.2.2.12 Relay chatter analysis
- + E.2.3 Seismic plant response analysis
- E.2.3.1 Scope of plant response analysis
- E.2.3.2 Plan response logic development
- E.2.3.3 Seismic PSA systems model
- E.2.3.4 Main elements of seismic PSA systems mo...
- E.2.3.5 Other elements of seismic PSA risk mode...
- E.2.3.6 System recovery model
- E.2.3.7 Assessment of seismically induced conse...
- + E.2.4 Seismic risk quantification
- E.2.4.1 Seismic risk quantification requirement...
- E.2.4.2 Scope of seismic risk quantification
- E.2.4.2 Level 1 seismic PSA sensitivity analysi...
- E.2.4.3 Level 1 seismic PSA uncertainty analysi...
- E.2.4.4 Level 1 seismic PSA importance analysis...
- + E.2.5 Seismically induced consequential hazards...
- E.2.5.1 General
- + E.2.5.2 Seismic-fire interactions assessment
- E.2.5.2.1 Seismic-fire interactions assessment ...
- E.2.5.2.2 Scope of seismic-fire interactions as...
- + E.2.5.3 Seismic-flood interactions assessment
- E.2.5.3.1 Seismic-flood interactions assessment...
- E.2.5.3.2 Scope of seismic-flood interactions a...
- E.3 Level 1 seismic PSA for other POSs
- + E.4 Level 2 seismic PSA at power
- E.4.1 Level 2 seismic PSA quantification
- + E.4.1.1 Level 2 seismic PSA quantification requ...
- E.4.1.2 Level 2 seismic PSA seismic sensitivity...
- E.4.1.3 Level 2 seismic PSA seismic uncertainty...
- E.4.1.3 Level 2 seismic PSA seismic importance ...
- E.4.2 Level 2 seismic PSA unique items
- + E.5 Level 2 seismic PSA for other POSs
- E.5.1 General considerations of Level 2 seismic...
- + E.6 PSA-based SMA
- + E.6.1 Description and scope of PSA-based SMA
- E.6.1.1 Plant response analysis in PSA-based SM...
- E.6.1.2 PSA-based SMA for other POSs
- E.6.2 Elements of PSA-based SMA
- + E.6.3 Seismic hazard and systems analysis
- E.6.3.1 Seismic hazard representation for PSA-b...
- E.6.3.2 Plant logic model
- E.6.3.3 Initiating events
- E.6.3.4 Non-seismic failures and human actions
- E.6.3.5 Relay chatter analysis
- E.6.3.6 Containment failure considerations
- + E.6.4 Seismic capacity evaluation
- E.6.4.1 Plant walkdown and screening reviews
- E.6.4.2 Plant-specific seismic capacity determi...
- E.6.4.3 Use of generic seismic capacity data
- + Annex F (normative)
- + F.1 Introduction
- + F.1.1 Description and scope of internal floods ...
- F.1.1.1 Scope of internal floods PSA
- F.1.1.2 Seismically induced floods
- F.1.2 Elements of internal floods PSA
- + F.2 Level 1 PSA for internal floods at power
- + F.2.1 NPP partitioning
- F.2.1.1 Flood areas set identification
- F.2.1.2 Flood areas set justification
- F.2.1.3 Flood areas set characterization
- + F.2.2 Flood source identification and character...
- F.2.2.1 Definition of flood sources
- F.2.2.2 Identification of flooding mechanisms
- F.2.2.3 Characterization of flood releases
- F.2.2.4 Flood event frequency quantification
- F.2.2.5 Data for flood sources characterization...
- + F.2.3 Flood consequence analysis
- F.2.3.1 Identification of flood propagation pat...
- F.2.3.2 Elements of flood propagation pathways
- F.2.3.3 Flood mitigation systems
- F.2.3.4 Operator response
- F.2.3.5 Flood-specific HEPs
- F.2.3.6 Identification of affected SSCs
- F.2.3.7 Definition of SSC susceptibility
- F.2.3.8 Evaluation of SSC operability
- F.2.3.9 Engineering analysis of flood scenarios...
- F.2.4 Flood walkdowns
- + F.2.5 Qualitative screening
- F.2.5.1 General
- F.2.5.2 Initial screening criteria
- F.2.5.3 Other screening considerations
- F.2.5.4 Human response based screening
- F.2.5.5 Flood barriers failure consideration
- + F.2.6 Flood scenario development
- F.2.6.1 Scope of flood scenario development
- F.2.6.2 Elements of flood scenarios
- F.2.6.3 High energy line break scenarios
- F.2.6.4 Grouping of flood scenarios
- F.2.6.5 Bounding flood scenarios consequences
- + F.2.7 Flood-induced IEs
- F.2.7.1 Identification of flood-induced IEs
- F.2.7.2 Definition of flood-induced IEs
- F.2.7.3 Grouping of flood-induced IEs
- F.2.7.4 Bounding of flood-induced IEs
- F.2.7.5 Flood-induced IE frequency
- F.2.7.6 Data sources for flood-induced IE frequ...
- F.2.7.7 Human induced floods during maintenance...
- F.2.8 A Quantitative screening
- F.2.8 A.1 General
- F.2.8 A.2 Justification of screening criteria
- + F.2.8 Flood-induced accident sequences and quan...
- F.2.8.1 Development of flood-induced accident s...
- F.2.8.2 Human reliability analysis
- F.2.8.3 Accident sequence quantification
- F.2.8.4 CDF estimation
- F.2.8.5 Scope of flood-induced risk quantificat...
- F.2.8.6 Level 1 internal flood PSA sensitivity ...
- F.2.8.7 Level 1 internal flood PSA uncertainty ...
- F.2.8.8 Level 1 internal flood PSA importance a...
- F.3 Level 1 PSA for internal floods for other P...
- + F.4 Level 2 PSA for internal floods at-power
- F.4.1 Level 2 PSA for internal floods unique it...
- + F.4.2 Level 2 internal flood PSA quantification...
- F.4.2.1 Level 2 internal flood PSA quantificati...
- F.4.2.2 Level 2 internal flood PSA sensitivity ...
- F.4.2.3 Level 2 internal flood PSA uncertainty ...
- F.5 Level 2 PSA for internal floods for other P...
- + Annex G (normative)
- + G.1 Introduction
- + G.1.1 Description and scope of high winds PSA
- G.1.1.1 Scope of high winds PSA
- G.1.1.2 Hazards considered in high winds PSA
- G.1.2 Elements of PSA for high winds
- + G.2 Level 1 PSA for high winds at power
- + G.2.1 High wind hazard identification and analy...
- G.2.1.1 Data for high wind hazard characterizat...
- G.2.1.2 High wind hazard curves
- G.2.1.3 Approaches for wind hazard curves
- G.2.1.4 Phenomena included in high wind PSA
- G.2.1.5 Hazard curves for high wind PSA
- G.2.1.6 Hazard curves for different wind types
- G.2.1.7 Uncertainty in high wind hazards
- G.2.1.8 Combination of hazards with high winds
- G.2.1.9 Wind-borne missiles
- G.2.1.10 Plant walkdown for wind hazards
- G.2.1.11 Transient material in wind missile ana...
- G.2.1.12 Uncertainty in wind missile analysis
- + G.2.2 High wind fragility analysis
- G.2.2.1 Site-specific wind fragilities
- G.2.2.2 Considerations for wind fragilities
- G.2.2.3 Components requiring fragility analysis...
- G.2.2.4 Plant walkdown requirements for wind fr...
- G.2.2.5 Uncertainty in wind fragility analysis
- + G.2.3 High wind plant response analysis and qua...
- G.2.3.1 Initiating event analysis for high wind...
- G.2.3.2 Accident sequence analysis for high win...
- G.2.3.3 Systems analysis for high wind PSA
- G.2.3.4 Inclusion of wind-related failures in s...
- G.2.3.5 HRA for high wind PSA
- G.2.3.6 Impact of high wind conditions and dama...
- G.2.3.7 Modelling of dependent hazards in high ...
- G.2.3.8 Uncertainty in plant response
- G.2.3.9 Quantification of high wind PSA
- G.2.3.10 Requirements for integration and quant...
- G.2.3.11 Level 1 high wind PSA sensitivity anal...
- G.2.3.12 Level 1 high wind PSA uncertainty anal...
- G.2.3.13 Level 1 high wind PSA importance analy...
- + G.3 Level 1 PSA for high winds for other POSs
- G.3.1 General
- G.3.2 Wind hazards for other POSs
- G.3.3 Wind-borne missile analysis for other POS...
- G.3.4 Wind fragility analysis for other POSs
- G.3.5 Plant response analysis for other POSs
- + G.4 Level 2 PSA for high winds at power
- G.4.1 Level 2 PSA unique items
- G.4.2 Level 2 PSA quantification
- + G.4.2.1 Level 2 PSA quantification requirements...
- G.4.2.2 Wind hazards for Level 2 PSA
- G.4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis for Level 2 high w...
- G.4.2.4 Uncertainty analysis for Level 2 high w...
- G.4.2.5 Importance analysis for Level 2 high wi...
- G.5 Level 2 PSA for high winds for other POSs
- + Annex H (informative)
- H.1 Identification of vulnerabilities
- H.2 Support operational programs
- H.3 Plant configuration control
- H.4 Post-accident response
- H.5 Miscellaneous
- + Annex I (informative)
- + I.1 Introduction
- I.1.1 Risk metrics
- I.1.2 Calculation of risk metrics
- I.1.3 Use of aggregation approaches
- + I.2 Application of aggregation approaches
- + I.2.1 Different POS of a reactor for a single h...
- I.2.1.1 Time-averaged risk metric
- I.2.1.2 Approaches for POS specific PSAs
- I.2.1.3 Calculation of time-averaged risk metri...
- + I.2.2 Integrated PSA model for a single reactor...
- I.2.2.1 Calculation of time-averaged risk metri...
- I.2.2.2 Approaches for integration of PSA model...
- I.2.2.3 Solution of integrated PSA model
- + I.2.3 Single hazard affecting multiple reactors...
- I.2.3.1 Calculation of risk metric for a single...
- I.2.3.2 Results of a single hazard analysis met...
- + I.2.4 Multiple hazards affecting multiple react...
- I.2.4.1 Calculation of risk metric for all haza...
- I.2.4.2 Interpretation of aggregated risk metri...
1.1 Reactors and other potential sources
This Standard provides the requirements and guidance for the preparation and maintenance of a PSA at a water-cooled NPP. The radiation sources of concern include both
a) water-cooled power reactors; and
b) other potential sources of radioactive releases to the environment.
Notes:
1) This Standard may be used to provide guidance for nuclear facilities other than NPPs or non-water-cooled reactors. Other nuclear facilities may apply this Standard using a graded approach commensurate with risk.
2) Water-cooled SMRs have not been explicitly considered in the development of this standard. However, this Standard might be generally applicable to water-cooled SMRs.3) “Other potential sources” include, for example, wet storage bays and dry used fuel storage facilities.
4) Systems that only contain radiation during post-accident conditions (e.g., Emergency Coolant Injection (ECI) recovery), are not considered in the identification of radiation sources. The source of radiation of those systems is the reactor, which is considered already as a source.
1.2 New and existing reactors
This Standard applies to both new and existing water-cooled NPPs.
Notes:
1) “Existing NPPs” refers to NPPs initially licensed before 2017.
2) “New NPPs” refers to NPPs initially licensed after 2016.
3) The requirements for a new NPP might be different than the requirements for an existing NPP. This Standard notes where the requirements might be different.
1.3 Single and multi-reactor facilities
This Standard applies to NPPs with one or more water-cooled power reactors.
Notes:
1) The requirements for a single-reactor NPP might be different than the requirements for a multi-reactor NPP. This Standard notes where the requirements might be different.
2) Provisions related to the risk aggregation and whole-site PSA are provided in Clauses 13 and Annex I.
1.4 Level 1 PSA and Level 2 PSA
This Standard addresses both Level 1 PSA and Level 2 PSA.
1.4A Whole-site PSA
This Standard applies to both specific PSAs and whole-site PSAs.
Notes:
1) A specific PSA might assess only a single hazard for a single source at a NPP. A whole-site PSA assesses all sources and all hazards.
2) Some parts of this Standard apply only to specific PSAs. For example, Annexes C to H apply only to specific hazards for power reactors. This Standard notes where requirements apply only to specific PSAs.
1.5 Malevolent acts
This Standard does not address and does not apply to malevolent acts.
Note: In Canada, malevolent acts are addressed separately under the CNSC Nuclear Security Regulations. (Ref. SOR/2000-209).
1.6 Terminology
In this Standard, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard.
Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material.
Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements.
Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (non-mandatory) to define their application.
1.7 Additional terminology
In this Standard, “shall be considered” or “shall consider” means that the user evaluates the impact and documents any decisions.
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